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Abstract
The concept of state failure in the modern world is a comparatively new notion, which did not emerge until
former colonial possessions in Africa and Asia, once fledgling states, seemed to be in decline. As governments
collapsed and states fractured into civil war, the developed world looked on. Nearly twenty years after the fall
of the USSR and the rise of state failure, scholars’ understanding of the causes of state weakness and state
failure remains incomplete, and the policy literature’s orientation toward economic causes of weakness is more
descriptive of weakness than insightful of its causes. This study seeks to gain greater insight into the causes of
state weakness by assessing eight socio-economic, political, and geographic variables in the five post-Soviet
Central Asian cases. While many of the results suggest greater insight into the political and geographic causes
of state weakness, several strongly indicate a close relationship between state stability and the state’s degree of
modernization and colonial experiences.
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STATE STABILITY IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA 
Erica Podrazik 
Abstract: The concept of state failure in the modern world is a comparatively new notion, which did not 
emerge until former colonial possessions in Africa and Asia, once fledgling states, seemed to be in decline. As 
governments collapsed and states fractured into civil war, the developed world looked on. Nearly twenty 
years after the fall of the USSR and the rise of state failure, scholars’ understanding of the causes of state 
weakness and state failure remains incomplete, and the policy literature’s orientation toward economic 
causes of weakness is more descriptive of weakness than insightful of its causes. This study seeks to gain 
greater insight into the causes of state weakness by assessing eight socio-economic, political, and geographic 
variables in the five post-Soviet Central Asian cases. While many of the results suggest greater insight into 
the political and geographic causes of state weakness, several strongly indicate a close relationship between 
state stability and the state’s degree of modernization and colonial experiences.   
INTRODUCTION 
 In the case of post-Soviet Central Asia, it may be tempting overlook state weakness, in part 
because the region is known for being comparatively weak, poor, and fragile. These five young 
states have historically maintained close colonial ties to Russia, first under the czars and then 
under the Soviets, not emerging as independent states until the fall of the USSR in 1991. 
Colonialism left its mark on the region; since independence these five states have struggled with 
impoverished and dependent economies, weak civil societies, and volatile and dangerously 
unstable neighbors like Afghanistan.1 Yet, almost twenty years after independence, some states are 
significantly more likely to fail than others. Although a comparatively unpopulated and often 
forgotten corner of the world, state collapse in Central Asia could have far reaching consequences. 
It is generally accepted that weak and failed states provide an ideal breeding ground for terrorists 
and other criminal organizations, away from the prying eyes of an established government trying 
to enforce the law. As the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York on September 11th 2001 proved, 
international terrorism is a growing threat, and further state failure in Central Asia, so close to 
problematic states such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, would merely serve as fuel for the fire. 
Whatever the consequences for the international community, state failure holds far more stringent 
consequences for the people of the failed state itself. One need look no further than the example of 
Somalia to understand the tremendous costs of state failure; endemic violence, human rights 
catastrophes, lack of access to necessities like food and healthcare, lawlessness and piracy. Given 
the significance of state failure and state weakness, then, it is well worth seeking to understand the 
causes of such phenomena, and how they can be prevented.               
 
                                                          
1 Roy Olivier, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (New York: New York University Press, 2005).  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The State and State Failure 
 A clear definition of the state is critical to the understanding of state failure. For the 
purposes of this research, the state refers to a defined territory with a defined form of government 
which, first, maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and, second, engages in the 
creation of a social contract with its citizens as a means by which to guarantee the creation of peace 
and security in exchange for the surrendering of some measure of personal freedom.2 State power, 
in turn, is measured by autonomy (the ability to make decisions free of coercion from internal and 
external actors) and capacity. States may weaken along any of these criteria, but true state failure 
occurs only when the state looses territorial sovereignty, can not maintain a monopoly on the uses 
of violence, and both autonomy and capacity are critically eroded.    
The Nature of State Failure 
  Because true state failure is rare (agreed upon cases generally include present day Somalia 
and the former Congo-Kinshasa), it is necessary to consider state failure as a single point on a wide 
spectrum. At one end stands the strong state, fully endowed with autonomy and capacity. This 
category includes many democracies and also authoritarian states, since the measure here is state 
strength, not state freedom. At the other end of the spectrum stands the failed state, which lacks all 
autonomy and capacity. In between are a host of states, ranked according to relative capabilities. It 
is understood, then, that a state can be a weak state (with weak autonomy and capacity) without 
being a failed state.3 Similarly, because a failed state must fully lack autonomy and capacity, it is 
evident that a state may actually fail in some of its duties but still be denied classification as a 
failed state. A pertinent example of this phenomenon is illustrated by the Latin American state of 
Colombia, in which the government maintains significant control of the economy but lacks control 
over several regions, where drug cartels, guerillas, and paramilitary groups maintain a monopoly 
on violence independent of the central government.   
 In 2006, the Crisis States Research Centre’s workshop at the London School of Economics 
set out to categorize those states that are broadly called “weak.” The result was three-part 
hierarchy classifying “fragile states,” “crisis states,” and “failed states.” 
 
                                                          
2 Mihn Nyugen, “The Question of ‘Failed States,’” View on Asia Briefing Series (Sydney, Australia: Uniya Jesuit 
Social Justice Center, 2005); R. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics (1960); D. 
North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990).  
3 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, “Failed States, or the State as Failure?,” The University of Chicago Law Review 72 
(Autumn 2005): 1159-1196.  
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TABLE 1 
Weak States 1 
State Type Fragile State Crisis State Failed State 
Characteristics 
• Particularly 
vulnerable to 
internal/external 
shocks/conflicts 
• Often 
characterized by 
weak institutions, 
poor law 
enforcement, and 
factionalism   
• Institutions 
face serious 
contestation 
• Danger of 
collapse 
• Lack 
resiliency to 
cope with 
conflict 
• Can no longer 
maintain 
territorial 
security 
• No control 
over 
territories and 
borders 
• Can no longer 
reproduce 
conditions for 
its own 
existence 
 
The resulting system is a useful one, primarily because it suggests that state failure is not simply 
“the end,” but rather a process of failing over a period of time that is flexible; the state can move 
toward or away from failure. Even more importantly, it “allows for a wide range in degrees of 
failing,4” which is a critical element in the understanding of state power structures.  
 It is evident, then, that states can fail across a variety of dimensions. It has been suggested 
that it is possible to rank state failure by a state’s inability to provide social or political goods. The 
model dominant in the field was proposed by Robert Rotberg5, and relies on the understanding 
that states exist to provide social and political goods to their citizens, including “security, 
education, health, economic opportunity, environmental surveillance, making and enforcing an 
institutional framework, and providing and maintaining infrastructure.”6 In order to calculate the 
severity of state failure (state weakness), Rotberg creates a hierarchical ranking of state functions: 
(1) The ability of the state to maintain internal security; (2) The ability of institutions to regulate 
conflict by maintaining the rule of law; (3) The ability to represent citizens in the international 
political arena; (4) The ability of the states to provide social goods and regulate the national 
economy. Failed states will fail in essentially all of the listed functions, while weak and failing 
                                                          
4 Jonathan DiJohn, “Conceptualizing the Causes of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature,” Crisis 
States Research Centre Working Papers Series 2 (January 2008): 1-53.  
5 Robert Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Summer 
2005): 85-96.   
6 Jonathan DiJohn, 2008.  
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states will show a mixed profile. Here, it is important to understand that no single element 
constitutes state failure, but every element contributes to a state’s perceived strength or weakness.7 
The Causes of State Weakness 
 To some degree, scholars already have a measure of understanding of the causes of state 
weakness and failure. In particular, the greatest percentage of such work has been conducted in 
regards to economic variables. For instance, it is generally accepted that states suffering 
economically are significantly more likely to become weak and failing states.8 While these studies 
are important landmarks, they are difficult to interpret simply because they raise the directionality 
question; while economic hardship may cause state weakness, state weakness may also cause 
economic hardship. Other studies suggest a correlation between state weakness , limited economic 
pluralism ,and limited business competition in late developing capitalist societies.9 
 One economic approach to state failure that has gained notoriety in the field examines the 
role resource scarcity plays in inciting political violence and violence against governmental 
authority. The literature suggests that where resource scarcity exists, the gap between the haves 
and the have-nots of social and political factions expands, and eventually erupts into violence. This 
violence undermines the state monopoly, and eventually breaks down state autonomy and 
capacity.10 
Similarly, there is evidence that environmental degradation increases the conflict for 
limited resources and can marginalize poorer classes, particularly in rural areas. In such instances, 
social and political unrest often occur, frequently resulting in displacement of native peoples and 
uncontrollable migration from conflict zones to stable areas. Such mass movements of people can 
further strain the state’s resources and heighten tensions with neighboring states, exacerbating the 
situation.11       
 The resource curse too, stands as another possible instigator of state weakness. In 
particular, commodities like oil, diamonds, and narcotics are thought to stymie diverse (and 
therefore increasingly stable) economic growth while simultaneously encouraging rent seeking 
behavior and the formation of greed-based insurgencies. Additional literature suggests that states 
                                                          
7 Robert Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” 85-96.   
8 P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, “On the economic consequences of war,” Oxford Economic Papers (1998): 50. 
9 A.Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press,1962); A. Amsden, The Rise of  ‘the Rest’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
10 T.F. Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity and Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).  
11 James Fairhead, “The Conflict over Natural and Environmental Resources” in E. Wayne Nafziger, Frances 
Stewart, Raimo Väyrynen, ed., War, Hunger and Displacement: Volume 1: The Origins of Humanitarian 
Emergencies –War and Displacement in Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 4.; I 
De Soysa, “Paradise is a bazaar? Greed, creed, and governance in civil war, 1989-1999,” Journal of Peace 
Research 39, no. 4 (2002); , J-F Bayart, The State in Africa: the Politics of the Belly (Paris: Fayard, 1993).  
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under the resource curse, being highly dependent on a single commodity, have little need to 
develop a strong bureaucracy in order to raise public funds. This in turn is thought to make states 
more vulnerable to insurgencies.12 Proponents of the so-named modernization theory suggest 
that the most stable states are those that have engaged in a modernization process. Although the 
process often requires a period of radical (even violent) economic and political change as 
traditional values and institutions are shed, the final result is a state with a strong central 
government. States that desire stability can be aided in this process by wealthy13 democracies, but 
those which do not may condemn themselves to poverty and instability. While there are many 
different branches of modernization theory the most important common aspect suggests that an 
international community of free market democracies provides the greatest conditions for state 
stability.      
 The literature examining political causes of state weakness is sparse, compared to the 
economic literature. A recent study by Marshall and Gurr (2003) suggests that authoritarian 
regimes may indirectly contribute to state weakness because they are more likely to result in 
political violence, which weakens the state by undermining the state’s monopoly on violence and 
hindering cohesive decision making and law enforcement.14  
 Work produced in 1995 by Hirschman examines the relationship between corruption and 
patronage and their affect on state weakness, eventually suggesting that internal corruption 
weakens the state structure by undermining state institutions.15Again, however, it is necessary to 
be clear about what is a measure of state weakness and what is a cause.  
 There is also some speculation that the way in which citizens define their socio-political 
identity may also play an important role in the creation of state stability. In particular, where clans 
are powerful social actors and individuals maintain a traditional identity over a state identity, 
there is greater potential for conflict between the state and clan leadership. Where citizens feel little 
obligation to the state, they may also be less inclined to support state institutions and political 
processes.16  
 The belief that the lasting effects of colonialism hinder the development of state strength 
has also taken root in recent years. Literature published in 2005 suggests that colonialism left 
several lasting marks on colonized states. First, it instigated a legacy of dual legalism, second, it 
frequently created a bifurcated state which operated differently in urban and rural areas, and lastly 
                                                          
12 T.L. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms in Petro States (Berkley: University of California Press, 1997).  
13 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1960).  
14 M. G. Marshall and T.R. Gurr, Peace and Conflict (College Park, MD: Center for International Development 
and Conflict Management, 2003).  
15 Ibid. 
16 Kathleen Collins, “The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia,” Comparative Politics 35, no. 2 (2003): 171-190. 
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it often legitimized despotic puppet regimes to enforce the colonizer’s will. Upon state 
independence, particularly where state independence occurred quickly and without oversight, 
political patronage emerged, reducing the possibilities for the creation of strong civic institutions 
which made state authority internally vulnerable.17  
 Similarly, it has been suggested that colonial rule promoted an incentive for leaders to 
utilize disorder or the illusion of disorder as a political instrument. The model proposed by Chabal 
and Daloz suggests that, where this occurs, political actors seek to capitalize on the climate of fear 
and uncertainty in order to accommodate the demands of elite factions, whose support is critical to 
the regime.18 While this political device may fulfill a short-term purpose, it misuses government 
power to achieve a limited political or economic payoff. In turn, state power is neither consolidated 
nor legitimized, and over time the climate of instability (real or illusion) deteriorates state capacity 
and autonomy.      
 Nicholas van de Walle’s work addresses the new nature of civil warfare, and provides 
important insight on one possible geographic cause of state stability. His work provides strong 
evidence to support the theory that states which lie in close proximity or share boarders with other 
failed and failing states have increased chances of falling victim to the same lawlessness and 
disorder. In this so-called “war next-door syndrome,” wars are seen as readily transmittable, like a 
plague, from one state to the next.19 An important corollary to de Walle’s work illustrates how the 
cross-border movement of refugees can strain states suddenly forced to maintain order and 
provide for thousands of displaced noncitizens, which in turn may complicate regional relations 
between states.20  
METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
Case Selection 
 In order to test the strength and importance of possible causes of state weakness and 
instability, this study examines the five post-Soviet Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This particular selection of cases is 
uniquely suited to a most similar comparative study, which selects a series of cases which possess 
similar traits in one or more instances. As a result, these similar variables are automatically 
                                                          
17 M. Lockwood, The State They’re In: An Agenda for International Action on Poverty in Africa (Bourton-on-
Dunsmore: ITDG Publishing, 2005).  
18 P. Chabal and J-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford: James Currey, 1999). 
19 Nicolas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001).; P. Wallensteen, and M. Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict and Regional 
Conflict Complexes, 1989-97,” Journal of Peace Research, 35, no. 5 (1998). 
20 R. Väyrynen, “The Age of the Humanitarian Emergency,” WIDER Research for Action 25 (Helsinki: WIDER, 
1996).  
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controlled for in the greater study. The cases of Central Asia are optimal for such a design, because 
although these former Soviet republics share so many traits in common, there is a distinct disparity 
in state strength across the region. See Table 2 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Regional Similarities 1 
 Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
Soviet Republic 1936 1924 1936 1925 1924 
Independence 16 Dec, 1991 27 Oct,  
1991 
31 Aug, 1991 9 Sept,  
1991 
1 Sept, 1991 
GDP/ PPP 
(2008 in 
thousands) 
$11,500 
 
$6,500 
 
$2,200 
 
$1,800  
 
$2,600  
 
Primary 
Exports 
Petroleum, 
natural gas 
Petroleum, 
natural gas 
Hydropower, 
gold 
Hydropower, 
petroleum 
Natural gas, 
petroleum 
HDI .804 .730 .710 .688 .710 
Percent Muslim 47% 89% 75% 90% 88% 
Freedom House 
Composite 
Score 
11 14 9 11 14 
Freedom House 
Status 
Not free Not free Partly free Not free Not free 
Government 
Type 
Presidential 
republic 
Presidential 
republic 
Presidential 
republic 
Presidential 
republic 
Presidential 
republic 
 
In particular, the case selections and most similar design controls for a host of potential variables. 
All of these cases originally became republics under Czarist Russia over the span of twelve years, 
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and then retained that status under the Soviet Union. With the fall of the USSR, the Central Asian 
republics were granted their independence, and within the span of several months each state had 
accepted its independence. Today, these states are classified as developing nations, all with a 
strong consolidation of presidential power and a historically Islamic populace. These regional 
uniformities cannot account for levels of state weakness in Central Asia today.      
 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable of this study is the degree of state weakness among the five states 
in the region. The Fund for Peace’s 2009 Index of Failed states provides such a measure, ranking 
177 states on their degree of success or failure in twelve aspects of state power. For the purposes of 
this study, the total score of each state’s ranking is used as a working dependent variable.  
 
TABLE 3 
The Dependent Variable 
 
Even a cursory glance at Table 2 suggests while none of the Central Asian states are particularly 
robust and none are democratic, their levels of weakness vary widely. The Failed State’s Index 
Country 
Rank 
(Strongest  
to  
Weakest) 
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(Strongest 
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Kazakhstan 105 72.5 6.0 3.9 5.5 4.0 6.4 
6.
4 7.7 5.3 6.8 6.5 7.6 6.4 
Turkmenistan 59 84.3 7.0 4.8 6.5 5.6 7.6 
6.
9 8.5 7.2 8.9 7.6 7.7 6.0 
Kyrgyzstan 42 89.1 8.0 5.3 7.2 7.5 8.3 
7.
6 8.3 6.5 7.6 7.7 7.3 7.8 
Tajikistan 37 90.3 8.2 6.4 6.9 6.5 7.3 
7.
5 8.9 7.6 8.6 7.5 8.4 6.5 
Uzbekistan 31 92.8 7.9 5.3 7.4 7.0 8.7 
7.
2 9.0 6.6 9.2 9.0 9.0 6.5 
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records a wide range of values for state stability across the region, with Kazakhstan ranked among 
the more stable and economically viable of the less developed countries, and Uzbekistan ranked 
among the weakest states in the world with particular problems in the field of human rights. 
 The question central to this study is: What causes some states in this region to be so much 
weaker than others? While it is comparatively easy to discern the signs of a weak or failing state, it 
is much more challenging to pick apart the causes of weakness in a particular state. Within the 
narrowed context of the five post-Soviet Central Asian nations, this study attempts to gain insight 
into those particular variables that cause Uzbekistan and neighboring Tajikistan to be so much 
closer to state failure than Kazakhstan. This research should provide some general propositions 
that will be applicable to state weakness and failure across a variety of settings.  
 
Independent Variables 
Socio-Economic Hypotheses      
 A series of eight independent variables are included in this study, sub divided into three 
categories of topics addressed in the literature, beginning with socio-economic factors. The first 
variable under consideration examines the evenness of economic development in each state. In 
particular, the GINI score is used to examine a measure of income inequality or unequal wealth 
distribution in a country.21 The second variable examines the degree to which the state under 
consideration has been modernized. In this case, the degree to which the population of a state has 
urbanized is used as a measure of modernity.22  
    
H1: States with uneven economic development are more likely to be weak than those with even 
economic development. 
H2: States which are less modern are more likely to be weak than those which are more modern. 
 Political Hypotheses 
 The second category of study focuses on political variables. The third variable for 
consideration in the cumulative list relates to a measure of Islamic fundamentalism in each of the 
five post-Soviet Central Asian cases. Because no readily obtainable statistic exists in this case, 
relevant data was taken from the scholarly literature and each state was assigned a measurement 
value between 0 and 2. In this instance, 0 indicates the presence of no tangible fundamentalist 
movement, 1 denotes states where fundamentalism is present but of limited concern on the 
national stage, and 2 indicates a state where fundamentalist groups represent a serious concern to 
internal stability and citizen safety.23  
                                                          
21 United Nation’s 2007-2008 World Human Development Report.  
22 2008 CIA WorldFactBook. 
23 Roy Olivier, 2005. 
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 Next, the fourth variable addresses the historical relationship between each state and the 
Soviet Union. Specifically, the degree to which each of these historically Muslim cases possesses a 
Russian Orthodox population is used as a measure of this variable.24 This measure was selected 
based on the rationale that the growth of Orthodox Christianity in the region will coincide with 
Russian presence, just as it has in other colonial cases. For instance, the spread of Christianity 
through southern Nigeria coincides heavily with colonial British presence in a historically Islamic 
region; the northern interior of the state, where British influence did not penetrate, is still 
predominately Muslim. It is not illogical, therefore, to suggest that Russo-Soviet influence had the 
same effect on religion in Central Asia. The fifth variable addresses the positive or negative nature 
of each case’s experience with Soviet colonialism. The measurement for this independent variable 
is drawn from the date of each state’s independence following the collapse of the USSR, based on 
the rationale that states with a particularly negative or exploitive experience would be the first to 
claim their independence. The variable is measured on a scale of 1-5, with 1 being the first state to 
gain independence and 5 the last state to gain independence.25    
 
H3: States with strong fundamentalist movements are more likely to be weak than those without 
strong fundamentalist movements. 
H4: States with a less privileged position within the Soviet-Union are more likely to be weak than 
states with more privileged positions.  
H5: States with a heavily exploitive experience with internal colonialism are more likely to be weak 
than states with a less exploitive experience.  
 Geo-Political Hypotheses 
The final category of variables under study is comprised of possible geo-political or 
external factors that may contribute to state weakness. The sixth variable endeavors to evaluate the 
fractured nature of the region’s ethnic groups, and utilizes a measure of the percent of the region’s 
most dispersed ethnic group, the Uzbeks, present in each case state.26 The seventh variable 
examines the importance of a state’s proximity to other weak or ailing states. For the purposes of 
this study, this measure comes from whether each state shares a border with Afghanistan, 
currently the most nearly failed state in the region. The measure was coded 0 if no border was 
shared and 1 if a border was shared. The eighth and final variable examines the relationship 
between the stability of each state and its geopolitical importance to America and its allies. To 
measure the relative geo-political importance of each state, this study utilizes a measure of each 
state’s level for foreign direct investment as a percentage of each state’s gross fixed capital 
                                                          
24 CIA WorldFactBook 
25 CIA WorldFactBook 
26 CIA WorldFactBook 
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formation.27 This particular measure was chosen based on the logical understanding that wealthy 
states are most inclined to invest in states with a measurable level of geopolitical importance, 
whether from economic resources or useful geographic location for regional military bases. 
H6: States with a large percentage of a regionally fractured ethnic group are more likely to be weak 
than those without a large percentage of such a group.  
H7: States located in proximity to weak states, like Afghanistan, are more likely to be weak than 
those without proximity to weak states. 
H8: States not of geo-political interest to the United States and its allies are more likely to be weak 
than states of geo-political interest.  
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
TABLE 4 
Data 
 Kazakhstan Turkmenistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
GINI 30.40 40.80 30.30 32.60 36.80 
% Urbanization 58% 49% 36% 26% 37% 
Fundamentalism 0 0 0 1 2 
% Orthodox 44% 9% 20% 0% 9% 
Independence 5 4 1 2 3 
% Uzbek 2.5% 5% 13.8% 15.3% 80% 
Proximity of Afghanistan 0 1 0 1 1 
% FDI 40.2% 39.9% 18.6% 39.9% 17.9% 
 
 First and foremost, it should be noted that, in light of the small sample size utilized in this 
study (only five cases) significant results are merely suggestive and do not necessarily indicate 
                                                          
27 2008 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Report. 
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generalizable results. Similarly, nonsignificant results are inconclusive and require further study 
before the null hypothesis can be confirmed or rejected.      
 
Socio-Economic Results 
TABLE 5 
Socioeconomic Results 
  
The results of a bivariate correlation indicate that my first hypothesis relating the level of state 
stability and income inequality suggests a weak relationship. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
yielded a small positive correlation of .265, but the correlation did not indicate any level of 
significance for the variable. Given the lack of evidence supporting the relationship between state 
stability and income inequality, the null hypothesis is supported in this instance.  
 The second hypothesis in the socio-economic category proves much more robust. A 
bivariate correlation relating state stability and urbanization (used here as a measure of 
modernization) revealed both a strong negative correlation of -.874 and significance at the .05 level.  
Therefore, the evidence suggests an inverse relationship between the variables; as a state’s level of 
modernization increases, the propensity for state weakness declines.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Correlation Coefficient Significance 
H1 GINI score .265 .333 
H2 % Urbanization -.874* .026 
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Political Results 
TABLE 6 
 Political Results 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Correlation Coefficient Significance 
H3 Fundamentalism .642 .121 
H4 % Orthodox Christian -.859* .031 
H5 Date of independence -.819* .045 
 The third hypothesis utilized in this study, relating state stability and the presence of 
religious (Islamic) fundamentalism showed mixed results. A bivariate correlation indicated a 
strong, positive correlation of .642, although Pearson’s correlation coefficient did not measure any 
significance. The correlation was expected in my hypothesis, and the issue raised by the lack of 
statistical significance may be explained by the methodology utilized in this study. Aside from the 
small sample size, the scale used was comparatively small and only utilized three measurement 
values- this lack of variation may have contributed to the lack of significance found. In addition, a 
return to the raw data in search of some explanatory power might prove useful.  
 The fourth hypothesis, comparing state stability and the percent of Orthodox Christians 
(used as a measure of Russification in the region) yielded a strong negative correlation of -.859 and 
obtained significance at the .05 level. Indeed, these results suggest that those states (such as 
Kazakhstan) closest in both geography and historical ties to Soviet Russia, and also the largest 
recipients of the USSR’s exported German and Russian population to the region, are more likely to 
be strong states.  By contrast, those states with smaller Orthodox populations and therefore less 
Soviet influence, particularly those in the southern part of the region like Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan, are more likely to be weak. As a result of past precedent and strong statistical support, 
there is sufficient support to reject the null hypothesis in this instance.    
 The fifth hypothesis, examining the relationship between state stability and the quality of 
each state’s relationship with the Soviet Union yielded a similarly strong negative correlation of -
.819 and obtained significance at the .05 level. Logic dictates that states which enjoyed a positive 
relationship with the USSR would be less pressed to claim independence after the fall of the Soviet 
Union than states with an overtly negative or oppressive relationship. With one exception, this 
holds true for the post-Soviet Central Asian cases. Kazakhstan, the breadbasket of the Soviet Union 
and the object of the USSR’s outstandingly successful Virgin Lands Campaign, stands as the most 
stable state in the region and also the state for which Soviet colonialism was arguably least 
disastrous. The weakest case in the region, Uzbekistan, is discernable as the state most abused 
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under Soviet rule. Massive Uzbek cotton fields and the laboring populations who worked them 
experienced extensive exploitation under Soviet rule, resulting in severe loss of life (including 
numerous instances of worker suicide in protest of Soviet oppression), severe environmental 
degradation from agrochemicals, and depletion of the Aral Sea.28 In this instance, the secondary 
literature supports the legitimacy of the measure used, and the correlation’s results validate the 
rejection of the null hypothesis.  
Geographic Results 
 
TABLE 7 
Geographic Variables 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Correlation Coefficient Significance 
H6 % Uzbeks .612 .136 
H7 Proximity to 
Afghanistan 
.567 .159 
H8 %FDI of fixed capital 
formation 
-.595 .145 
 
 The sixth hypothesis under examination in this study examines the relationship between 
state stability and the extent to which each state contains a measurable Uzbek population. 
Although the bivariate correlation measures the positive correlation of .612 without statistical 
significance, the raw data suggests a much stronger correlation than the results yield (see Table 4). 
Why these two variables appear to be related is unclear. Logic suggests that, because the Uzbeki 
people are the most geographically dispersed ethnic group in the region, they are inclined to have 
the most difficulty creating a cohesive national identity and therefore the most difficulty creating a 
stable nation state. This does not fully explain why the presence of Uzbeks in other states correlates 
with state weakness, but it may be that where a minority ethnic group lacks a national identity, 
they are less inclined to support state institutions or law, thereby weakening the host state.    
 The seventh hypothesis relating state stability and state proximity to weak or failing states 
yielded a positive correlation of .567, although the results were not statistically significant. In this 
particular instance, there is some evidence that the correlation would have simply benefited from a 
larger sample size. Nicholas van de Walle’s work on this topic in Africa suggests a much stronger 
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correlation, and his work had the advantage of a sample size more than twice the size of this study. 
In this instance, the most important observation to be made lies in the understanding that the two 
weakest states in the region share sizable, porous borders with Afghanistan, while the strongest 
state in the region does not; it shares a border with southern Russia, a notably stable (if 
increasingly authoritarian) state.  
 The eighth and final hypothesis compares the relationship between state stability and each 
state’s possession of foreign direct investment as a percent of the state’s fixed capital formation. 
Bivariate correlations indicated a moderately strong negative correlation of -.595, indicating an 
inverse relationship between the variables. Although these results are not significant, they do 
suggest that states with sound FDI are more likely to be stable states than those without.  
CONCLUSION 
 Consistently, Turkmenistan stands as the outlier in the region. It never enjoyed a strong or 
positive relationship with the Soviet Union (despite being the fourth state to claim its 
independence), and as one of the more remote southernmost states in the region it shares a long 
boarder with Afghanistan. Nonetheless, Turkmenistan claims a very stable position as the second 
most stable state in the region. Turkmenistan’s unanticipated status may be a result of the unique 
path it took following independence. While neighboring states struggled to create a functioning 
government and civil society, Saparmuran Niyazov quickly seized the reins of government and 
titled himself Turkmenbashi and president for life. Niyazov’s dictatorship, which centered on his 
cult of personality, lasted until his death in 2006. His state’s present stability may be a result of a 
strong and lasting authoritarian regime.   
 The states of post-Soviet Central Asia provide an extraordinarily rich context within which 
to examine the causes of state weakness.  With one exception, the hypotheses seeking to explain 
the causes of state weakness were validated by the results. While the relationship between state 
stability and income inequality appears weak at best, and the variables dealing with geography 
encourage more research, the three independent variables dealing with degrees of modernization 
and the strength and quality of colonial relationships with the USSR yielded strong evidence of 
importance in the region. Ultimately, the data suggests that in the five post-Soviet Central Asian 
cases, colonialism may have acted as a modernizing force in states where a strong Soviet presence 
existed, particularly Kazakhstan. Combined with privileged position within the USSR and a 
positive relationship with Moscow, these states emerged from independence and developed into 
relatively stable states. Those states not deemed worthy of Russification, particularly Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan, were not subjected to modernizing forces, but instead reduced to cases of colonial 
exploitation. As a result, they emerged from independence as devastated states with minimal 
economic and political resources to aid them in the creation of a stable state. 
